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2.1  Introduction 
In April  1981, near the beginning of the NBER project on corporate 
capital structures, I reported on the behavior of debt and equity returns 
over the last half-century. Resource utilization and inflation varied widely 
over that period, as did real and nominal ex post returns on debt and equity 
claims. My analysis of the factors affecting returns was based largely on a 
relatively crude examination of the data. I return three and a half years 
later (September 1984) with a shorter (quarter-century) perspective and 
with the benefit of extensive econometric testing. 
Some of the findings discussed in this chapter are the same as those em- 
phasized in my earlier paper. For example, a strong systematic relation- 
ship between ex post  equity returns  and business cyJe  turning  points 
seemed to exist in my earlier analysis, with returns being extraordinarily 
large around cycle troughs and small around cycle peaks. This relation- 
ship is easily verifiable econometrically and is even stronger after 1980 
than before. On the other hand, data from the 1951-80 period were largely 
consistent with Treasury bill rates moving one-for-one with expected in- 
flation and being independent of everything else, a view obviously incon- 
sistent with the high real short-term rates that have prevailed since 1980. 
This chapter is divided into three broad parts and a short summary. I 
begin with an analysis of ex post returns on corporate bonds and equities, 
then turn to an examination of real after-tax 6-month bill rates, and con- 
clude with an explanation of new issue coupons on 6-month and 20-year 
Treasury securities. Econometric results on the determinants of ex post re- 
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turns and new issue coupons are summarized. The general procedure is to 
establish relationships on semiannual data from the 1950% 1960% and 
1970s and then to deduce their applicability to the early 1980s. 
2.2  The Business Cycle and Ex Post Equity and Bond Returns 
My earlier study contained evidence that corporate equities systemati- 
cally outperformed corporate bonds near business cycle troughs and un- 
derperformed them near business cycle peaks. The evidence was obtained 
by dividing the months between January 1926 and December 1978 into 
three types of periods: those around peaks, those around troughs, and the 
remainder. The peak periods were defined as the last 6 months of every ex- 
pansion and the first half (dropping fractions) or first 6 months, whichever 
was less, of every contraction. The trough periods were defined as the last 
half (dropping fractions) or last 6 months, whichever was less, of  every 
contraction and the first 6 months of every expansion. I then divided the 
total 1926-78  period into 10 overlapping intervals that contained single 
adjoining peaks and troughs and all the surrounding months that did not 
overlap with adjacent peak and trough periods. That is, the intervals ex- 
tended from 6 months after a trough to 6 months before the second fol- 
lowing peak. 
These 10 overlapping intervals are listed at the left in table 2.1. Also re- 
produced are the arithmetic means (annualized) during the trough periods 
within the  interval,  the  peak  periods  within the  interval,  the normal 
able  2.1  Annualized Difference between Retnrns on  Equities and Bonds 
Near Troughs, Near Peaks, and in Other Periods (Percent) 
Near  Near  Other  Excess  Excess 
Troughs  Peaks  Months  Near Troughs  Near Peaks 
Jan 26-Feb  29 
June 28-Nov  36 
Jan 39-May  48 
May 46-Jan  53 
May SO-Feb  57 
Dec 54-Oct 59 
Nov 58-June  69 
Sept 61-May  73 
June 71 -Dec  78 
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months (months not classified as either peak or trough months), and the 
differences in average returns between the peak and normal months and 
between the trough and normal months. The latter were labeled the excess 
net returns near peaks and troughs, respectively. As noted, the data were 
striking. The excess net returns on equities around troughs averaged 24%, 
and no net return was less than 14%. In contrast, the excess net returns on 
equities were negative around all peaks, except that at the end of World 
War 11, and averaged -15%.  When the analysis was restricted to the six 
cycles between 1946 and 1978, the average excess net return on equities 
around peaks was -  20% and no return exceeded -  5%. 
These data raise three questions. First, are equity returns, bond returns, 
or both sensitive to the business cycle? Second, can a significant propor- 
tion of the variation in equity and/or bond returns during the 1953-79 pe- 
riod be explained by the business cycle turning points? Third, has the im- 
portance of the turning points continued in the 198Os? To answer these 
questions, I begin with a regression of ex post 6-month returns (times 2 to 
annualize them) on equities and bonds on constant terms and two turning- 
point variables. The variables assume values equal to the fraction of  the 
half-year that consists of, respectively, peak or trough months as defined 
in the previous paragraph.'  (Given that the average cycle is just under 5 
years, the economy is near a peak about one-fifth of  the time and near a 
trough another one-fifth.) The results are for the 54 semiannual observa- 
tions in the 1953-79 period. As can be seen from the first equation sum- 
marized in table 2.2, all three variables are statistically significant in the 
equity equation (T-statistics are in parentheses under the coefficients), 
and 36% of the variation in 6-month returns is explained. Further, the sec- 
ond equation shows that while the trough variable is marginally signifi- 
cant in the bond returns equation, the peak variable adds no explanatory 
power and only 10% of the variation in bond returns is explained. Thus, 
the answers to the first and second questions are that the business cycle 
largely affects equity, not bond, returns and that the impact is large. In 
roughly the year surrounding business cycle troughs, the return on equi- 
ties is 32 percentage points greater than the normal 9%. In roughly the 
year around peaks, the return is 20 percentage points less than the 9% 
norm. 
This conclusion is supported by two additional tests reported in table 
2.2.2 In the first, I examine the excess of equity and bond returns over the 
6-month bill rate at the beginning of the half-year. The results are changed 
little from the straight returns equations. Second, I add the unexpected 
1. Cycle turning points through the January 1980peak are listed in Hendershott (1982, ta- 
ble 1.3, p. 21). Since then the U.S.  economy has experienced a trough in July 1980, a peak in 
July 1981, and a trough in November 1982. 
2. See Hendershott and Huang (1985) for a wide variety of estimates. 38  Patric H. Hendershott 
’Igble 2.2  Response of Ex Post Corporate Equity and Bond Returns to the 
Business Cycle, 1953-79 
Response to 
Dependent 
Variable  Constant  Cycle  Cycle  Unanticipated 















.090  .320  -.206 
(2.6)  (3.9)  (-2.6) 
.027  .077  -.032 
(1 5)  (2.0)  (-0.9) 
.039  ,339  -.214 
(1.1)  (4.1)  (-2.7) 
-  .032  .114  -.039 
(1.4)  (2.3)  (-0.8) 
.36  .198  2.52 
.10  .095  1.97 
.37  .202  2.43 
.ll  .135  1.99 
.004  -.003  -.022  1.107  .81  .045  2.03 
(0.4)  (-0.1)  (-1.2)  (13.3) 
Note: t-ratios are in parentheses beneath the estimated responses (coefficients). 
capital  gain  on 20-year  Treasury  bonds  during  the  6-month  period, 
UNCG, as a regressor, where 
UNAR20  (1 +R20)”  - 1 
R20  (1 +  R20)20 
UNCG  = 
and the calculation of unexpected change in the 20-year rate, UNAR20, is 
described in Hendershott and Huang (1985, app. B). Forces causing unex- 
pected capital gains (and thus large returns) on one asset will also induce 
large returns on assets that are close substitutes. The unexpected-gains 
variable has a negligible effect on equity returns but an enormous positive 
effect on corporate bond returns, as indicated by the last equation in table 
2.2. Clearly corporate and Treasury bonds are very close substitutes, and 
thus unexpected Treasury rate changes explain most of the movement in 
ex post corporate bond returns. Also, the slight impact the trough cycle 
variable seems to have on corporate bond returns is due to a correlation 
between this variable and unexpected changes in the Treasury rate, not to 
the independent effect of the trough variable.’ 
3. While a number of proxies for unexpected capital gains on equities (or changes in its re- 
quired rate of  return) were tested in the equities equation, none significantly  diluted the esti- 
mated impact of the turning-point variables. 39  Debt and Equity Returns Revisited 
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Fig. 2.1  Annualized 6-month equity returns, actual (A), predicted (P), 
and forecast, 1953-84 
The actual and predicted (by the first equation in table 2.2) equity re- 
turns are plotted in figure 2.1. The 54 points to the left of the vertical line 
are in sample; the 9 points to the right are forecasts for the 1980-mid-1984 
period. In sample the equation misses the entire early 1962 stock market 
plunge, much of the early 1970 (Cambodian incursion) crash, and more 
than the entire late 1974 decline. Of course, each of these market sell-offs, 
and the corresponding equation error, was largely reversed in the subse- 
quent 6 months. (The general negative correlation of errors was indicated 
by the 2.52 Durbin-Watson ratio.) 
The estimated equation is considerably more successful in explaining 
equity returns the 1980s than during the estimation period itself. Most of 
the large gains in 1980 and the mid-1982-mid-1983 period occurred in 
near-trough periods and thus are picked up by  the equation. The root 
mean square error is 0.190, about the same as during the estimation period, 
but the volatility of returns so far in the 1980s has been far greater than in 
the previous quarter-century. The cycle dummies explain 72% of the vari- 40  Patric H. Hendershott 
ation of equity returns in the first half of the 198Os, about double the per- 
centage explained during the estimation period. 
As another measure of the forecasting ability of this equation, I com- 
puted the cumulative percentage forecast error over the nine semiannual 
periods as 
9  ERRi 
CUMERR =T  (1  +-  I - I, 
I= I  2 
where ERRi is the error from the estimated equation in the ith period. The 
result is a negligible 0.003. That is, the 41/-year forecast of the stock mar- 
ket plus cumulative dividends is within a half percent of the actual. So our 
third question-Does  the estimated cyclical influence on equities hold up 
in the 198Os?-is  answered strongly in the affirmati~e.~ 
While the cycle dummy variables explain over a third of the variation in 
equity returns over the 1953-79 period, the variables obviously cannot ex- 
plain extended market booms or busts, and there was, of course, a major 
market collapse between 1968 and 1978, with most of the decline coming 
after 1972. To illustrate the failure of our equation to capture this decline, 
unity plus the cumulative error over the 1953-79 period is plotted in figure 
2.2. Along with it is Tobin’s average q, the ratio of the market value (debt 
plus equity) of firms to the replacement cost of assets, as presented in the 
1983 Economic Report of the President (table B-88, p. 263). The general 
correlation between the series, especially after 1962, is obvious. The exis- 
tence of the 1969-78 decline and the failure of the regression equation to 
capture it explains the low (0.36) explanatory power in the 1953-79 period 
relative to the first half of the 1980s, when no prolonged decline (or in- 
crease) occurred. 
Many explanations have been advanced for the 1969-78 stock market 
decline (see Hendershott [1981] for a summary and critique of  most of 
them). That which I find most appealing, however, is the “relative factor 
price hypothesis,” according to which unanticipated relative factor price 
changes caused previously optimal outstanding capital to become subop- 
timal. Given a putty-clay technology, the profitability of existing capital, 
and thus the value of ownership claims to this capital, declined in response 
to sharp revisions in expectations regarding factor prices. Most of  the 
roughly one-third decline in q after 1972 can, in fact, be explained by un- 
expected factor price changes (Elmer and Hendershott 1984). 
2.3  Nominal and Real Short-Term Interest Rates and Inflation 
When I  examined interest rates and inflation in early 1981, financial 
economists were still in the “Fama era” of constant real interest rates. 
4. While hardly surprising, I note that ex post bond returns have continued in the 1980s to 
be largely explained by unanticipated changes in new issue coupon rates on 20-year Treasur- 
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Fig. 2.2  Unity plus the cumulative stock market error since 1953 (E) 
and Tobin's q (Q),  1955-79 
Study after study of  data from the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s documented 
the roughly one-for-one response of interest rates to changes in inflation. 
Between 1952 and 1980, the real 1-month bill rate averaged 0.5% with a 
standard deviation of only 1.5%. I noted, however, that the real bill rate 
was not constant prior to 195 1. Most important, the real rate exceeded 4% 
in each year in the 1926-30 period.' 
5. Between  1931 and 1951 the nominal bill rate was near zero, and thus the real rate was 
roughly the negative of the inflation rate and ranged between 10% in 1931 and -  17% in 
1946. 42  Patric H. Hendershott 
Interest rates have become a far more interesting topic in recent years. 
No longer is every little squiggle in nominal rates attributed to a change in 
expected inflation (although the St. Louis Fed seemed rather reluctant to 
give up this view), and numerous papers have recently been written on 
why interest rates are too high relative to inflation. And high they are. 
Since late 1980, real 6-month Treasury bill rates have averaged around 
5.5%.  Very likely, the real 6-month bill rate will exceed 4% in each year in 
the 1981-84 period, strikingly similar to the late 1920s. 
Figure 2.3 contains plots of the real 6-month bill rate before and after 
tax. The bill rate is the average of  daily figures (of beginning- and end-of- 
month data before 1960), on a bond-equivalent  basis, for June and De- 
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Fig. 2.3  After-tax 6-month bill rates for marginal investors in the zero 
tax bracket (Z) and in that bracket implied by tax-exempt 
yields (E), 1953-84 43  Debt and Equity Returns Revisited 
Table 2.3  Real After-Tax Treasury Bill  Rates 
Real After-Tax 
Rate 
Tax-Rate  Nominal  Expected 
6-Month  6-Month  Unanticipated 
Bill Rate  Inflation  0  0.423*  Inflation 
1954 -  73  4.15  1.72  2.43  0.74  1.06 
(0.93)t  (0.78)t 
(1.13)t  (0.66)t 
(1.40)t  (1.58)t 
1974-mid-80  7.58  7.02  .85  -2.70  1.95 
mid-80-mid-84  12.08  6.42  5.66  .25  -  1.31 
*This is unity less the average ratio of  the yields on  12-year tax-exempt (prime grade) 
taxable (Treasury) securities over the 1954-84  period. The actual ratio for each period 
is employed in the calculations. 
tThe standard deviations of  the real after-tax rates are reported in parentheses 
underneath the mean values. 
Sources: The text and Hendershott (1984). 
sponding number for 6-month inflation from the Livingston survey. The 
extraordinarily high level of real bill rates in the 1980s is obvious. In the 
eight observations from December  1980 to June 1984, the real bill rate 
averaged over 5.5%.  This is 4 percentage points higher than the average of 
the 1960s and 1970s. 
The appropriate tax rate to employ in a study of real after-tax bill rates 
is uncertain, and it would probably not be difficult to find economists 
who would advocate rates as low as zero and as high as the corporate tax 
rate. One possible way of determining the relevant tax rate is to compare 
the yields on high-quality tax-exempt securities with those on bilk6  The 
real after-tax bill rate, according to this scheme, is then the tax-exempt 
rate less the expected inflation rate. This representation of  the after-tax 
real bill rate, indicated by the dashed line in figure 3.3, tells a far different 
story than the before-tax real rate. In only one observation in the 1980s 
(June 1982) is the real after-tax rate out of line relative to the 1960s. The 
rate is high in the 1980s only relative to the extraordinarily low rates in the 
1970s.' 
The data in table 2.3 highlight the instability of  real interest rates, 
whether the marginal tax rate of investors is as low as zero or as high as 
0.4, during the last decade relative to the preceding two decades. The real 
6. Unity less the ratio of prime grade 1-year municipal rates to 1-year Treasuries, both 
from Salomon Brothers and Hutzler, is utilized. 
7. One extreme outlier in both rate series in recent years is worthy of  note. The -  3% real 
bill rate in June 1980 was 2.5% below any other observed bill rate in the entire period, and 
the -  6.3% after-tax real rate was also 2.5% below any other. The record declines to  unprec- 
edented lows and the even sharper immediate reversals cry out for an  extraordinary explana- 
tion. Fortunately, one is available. In March 1980, the Federal Reserve implemented a credit 44  Patric H. Hendershott 
rate based on a zero tax investor averaged 2.43% in the 1954-73 period 
with a standard deviation (listed in parentheses beneath the mean) of only 
0.93%. For the remainder of the 1970s, the rate fell to 0.85%, and it then 
jumped to 5.66% during the last 4 years. In spite of the subdivision of the 
last decade into two parts, the standard deviation of the real rate within 
the last subperiod was 50% higher than during the entire earlier two dec- 
ades. The increase in the standard deviation is an even greater 100% if the 
tax bracket implied by the ratio of exempt to taxable rates is utilized. Note 
that real after-tax rates based on  this tax bracket are extraordinarily low in 
the 1974-mid-1980 period and are not higher in the 1980s than they were 
in the 1954-73 period. 
The last column in table 2.3 contains the average difference between the 
rate of  change in the consumer price index net of the shelter component 
(to exclude the impact of changes in home mortgage rates) for each 6- 
month period less that forecast by Livingston interviewees at the begin- 
ning of  the period. Unanticipated inflation so measured averaged 1  'To  in 
the 1954-73  period, 2% in the 1974-mid-1980 span (which included half 
of the first oil price shock and all of the second), and -  1.33% since then. 
For those who might think that actual inflation is a better measure of ex- 
pected inflation than is the Livingston forecast, this unexpected inflation 
series should be subtracted from the real interest rates in table 2.3 to ob- 
tain preferred measures of real rates. This adjustment would increase the 
already enormous rise in real rates between the 1970s and 1980s by 3.25 
percentage points. 
Given that economists are unsure of even what the interest rate puzzle 
is-high  real rates in the 1980s, low rates in most of the 1970s, or both-it 
should not be surprising that there is little agreement on the determinants 
of  rates. Wilcox (1983) attributes the low real rates in the mid-1970s to 
supply shocks (to the increase in real import prices). Many, most notably 
Clarida and Friedman (1984), cite tight money for the higher rates in the 
1980s until late 1982, and Hendershott and Shilling (1982) and deLeeuw 
and Holloway (1983) point to the business tax cuts and easy fiscal policy 
generally as the source of  high rates. Others cite deregulation, volatile 
money growth, volatile interest rates, and so on. 
2.4  An Explanation of  Changes in New Issue Yields 
Changes in new issue yields are of  paramount importance to ex post 
bond returns. These changes are also important to ex post equity returns 
controls program that included a non-interest-bearing reserve requirement of  15%  on in- 
creses in credit. Apparently as a result, consumer installment credit outstanding contracted 
at an annual rate of 10.5% in the April-May period, the first decline since May 1975 and the 
largest reduction since World War 11. The controls program was eased in late May and termi- 
nated on July 24, 1980. 45  Debt and Equity Returns Revisited 
insofar as real interest rates influence the business cycle. And while I 
would not overemphasize the importance of real rates-who  would dare 
in light of  the 1983-84 economic expansion?-there  is no doubt that real 
rates matter. Thus I conclude this chapter with an examination of the de- 
terminants of changes in new issue rates. 
Given the diverse views held by financial economists on the determi- 
nants of interest rates, a consensus interpretation of their views cannot be 
presented.  I  will  simply summarize the  findings of  my  research.  My 
framework draws together two views of interest rate determination: the 
expectations theory, whereby expected changes in rates can be inferred 
from forward rates, and structural models of  rates, in which unexpected 
changes in rates can be attributed to unanticipated changes in expected in- 
flation, economic activity, monetary growth, and possibly other factors. 
The variables explained are the changes, over semiannual periods, in the 
6-month and 20-year Treasury rates described earlier. For unanticipated 
changes in expected inflation and economic activity, I utilize the differ- 
ence between actual data and Livingston Survey expectations of inflation 
6 and 12 months in the future and of industrial production 6 months out; 
for monetary growth I use the difference between the current growth rate 
and that during the previous 2 years (no survey data are available). The 
data are described in Hendershott (1984). While the inflation expectations 
data are appropriate for the 6-month bill rate, they are obviously an ex- 
tremely rough approximation to the expectations relevant to a long-term 
interest rate. 
The results of this estimation are summarized in table 2.4, in which only 
coefficients  on the key variables are reported. The bill rate equation is es- 
timated on data beginning in 1960 when data for 12-month bills first be- 
came available; the estimation ends in 1979 in order to determine the ability 
of rate relations estimated prior to the 1980s to explain the movement of 
rates in the early  1980s. The equations  explain about one-third of the 
changes in rates. 
To no one’s surprise, I trust, expected inflation matters. The 0.738 coef- 
ficient in the bill rate equation (with a standard error of 0.24) is consistent 
with the results of a large number of previous studies. The low (0.18) coef- 
ficient in the bond rate equation probably reflects a general tendency for 
long-run expected inflation to move by much smaller amounts than short- 
run expected inflation. 
Possibly to the surprise of  some, real  activity also matters  to debt 
yields.* These estimates suggest that, other things being equal, the 6- 
month bill rate will be about 2 percentage points higher when the economy 
is operating at 90% capacity than when it is at 70% capacity, and the 20- 
8. Clarida and Friedman (1984) and Makin and Tanzi (1983) also report large real income 
effects. 46  Patric H. Hendershott 
Table 2.4  Responses of the Treasury Bill and Bond Rates to Inflation and 
Industrid Production Surprises and to Expected Interest Rate 
Changes 
Responses to 
Unexpected  Unexpected 
Change  Change 
in Expected  in  Expected 
Change  Dependent  Period of  6-Month  Industrial 
Variable  Estimation  Inflation  hoduction  in the Rate 
Change in 
6-month  1960-79  .738  .0746  .720 




bond  1953-79  .180  .0307  .943 
rate  (semiannual)  (2.4)  (3.3)  (1.6) 
Nore: The numbers in parentheses are t-ratios. 
Sources: The first equation is described in Hendershott (1984).  The second equation is 
entirely analogous, employing the same variables except for the 20-year Treasury bond 
rate and the expected change in it. These two variables are described in Hendershott 
and Huang (1984, app B). 
year bond rate will be about three-quarters of a point higher. The cyclical 
movement of the real bill rate is obvious from figure 2.1, where high val- 
ues occur around all business cycle peaks (1953, 1957, 1959, 1969, 1973, 
and 1979). Moreover, analysis, in a somewhat different framework, of the 
1-month bill rate is fully consistent with this result.  Hendershott  and 
Huang (1984) conclude that the 1-month rate would be a full 2% points 
higher. 
Most surprising, at least to some academics, is the role of expected in- 
terest rate changes. Recent research has attacked the expectations theory 
of the term structure of interest rates; expected changes in rates implied by 
forward rates are said to have negative value in explaining ex post rate 
changes.’  In contrast, the estimated coefficients reported in table 2.4 are 
close to the expected value of unity and are significantly positive at the 
95 Yo  and 90% confidence levels, respectively. 
The estimated (through December 1979) equations have been used to 
interpret the rise and fall in the rates between June 1978 and December 
1982. Table 2.5 contains the  results.  Eighty percent  (6.70  percentage 
points) of the 8.42 increase in the bill rate to December 1980 is explained 
9. See Shiller et al. (1983) and Mankiw and Summers  (1984). However, Fama (1983) finds 
a modest value in forecasts, and Brennan and Schwartz (1982) and Buser and Hendershott 
(1984) report evidence of short rates reverting toward long rates. 47  Debt and Equity Returns Revisited 
able  2.5  The 1978-82 Interest Rate Cycle 
June 78 -  Dec. 80/  Dec. 80/June 81 - 
June 81  Dec. 82 
&Month  20-Year  6-Month  20-Year 
Bill  Bond  Bill  Bond 
Change in  Rate  8.42  4.80  -  7.40  -  2.26 
Due to: 
Unexpected Change in 
Expected Idation  5.16  1.14  -3.54  -  .74 
Unexpected Change in 
Industrial Production  .66  .39  -  1.48  -  .73 
Change in Idation 
Uncertainty  .53  .16  -  .55  -  .17 
.35  -  .42  -  1.20  -  .06  Other (largely expected 
change in the rate)  ~--- 
Total  6.70  1.27  -  6.99  -  1.70 
Unexplained Change  1.72  3.53  -  .41  -  .56 
December 1980 is considered the peak for the bill rate; June  1981 for the bond rate. 
by the equation. Over 5 points is due to unexpected increases in anticipated 
inflation, two-thirds of a point to unexpected increases in output, one. 
half point to the increase in inflation uncertainty, and one-third point to 
other factors. Because the expected inflation rate rose by only 4.1 percent- 
age points, the real interest rate increased by 4.3 percentage points. Of this 
rise, the estimated equation explains 2.6 (6.7 - 4.1) points, or 60%. The 
estimated relationship also explains 60% of the extraordinarily high aver- 
age real bill rates in the early 1980s. 
One and a half percentage points of the 2.6-percentage point explained 
increase in the real bill rate can be attributed to the unanticipated  in- 
creases in industrial production, inflation uncertainty, and other factors 
noted above. However, the primary single factor contributing to the rise 
was.unexpected  increases in  inflation far in excess of  the  actual 4.1- 
percentage-point increase. From mid-1978 to mid-1979, no increase was 
expected, but a 2-point rise occurred. From late 1979 to late 1980 half- 
point increases were anticipated, while the actual expected rate rose by an- 
other 2 points. In total, the cumulated unexpected increase in anticipated 
inflation over this span was a full 7 percentage points. Even though the es- 
timated coefficient on expected inflation increases is only 0.74, implying 
that the nominal bill rate rises by only three-quarters of a point for every 
point of unanticipated  increase in inflation, the forecasted nominal bill 
rate rises by 5.2 points because of this 7-point increase, and thus the real 
bill rate rises by over a full point. 48  Patric H. Hendershott 
Between the end of 1980 and the end of  1982, the bill rate declined by 
nearly 7.5 percentage points. Nearly 95% of this decline is explained by 
the estimation equation. All the factors that contributed to the early in- 
crease in the bill rate reversed themselves, inducing the decline. Unexpected 
declines in industrial protection, inflation uncertainty, and the catch-all 
“other” tended to lower the real rate by 3 percentage points, but a smaller 
decline in unexpected than in actual inflation, along with the only partial 
(0.74) response of nominal rates to unexpected changes in inflation, par- 
tially offset the decrease in the real rate. 
This explanation of the bill rate cycle is remarkably good, in my less 
than humble opinion, because most of the unprecedented increase in rates 
and all of the decrease came after the estimation period. Two problems of 
the forecast should be noted, however. First, the equation does not pick 
up the interyear oscillations in either 1980 (due to the credit controls, see 
n.  7) or  1982. Second, the  forecasted 6-month rate is  1% percentage 
points above the actual value at the end of 1982 (the 1.72-point underesti- 
mate of  the increase less the 0.41-point underestimate of the decrease). 
That is, the real rate is 1  % points too high (relative to 1978), possibly due 
to some of the factors discussed earlier but not captured in our equation. 
A similar, but far less satisfactory, explanation of the bond rate cycle is 
also summarized in table 2.5. The inability to explain much more than a 
quarter of the rise in this rate almost certainly follows from the inade- 
quacy of the 6-month expected inflation rate as a proxy for long-run ex- 
pected inflation. Long-run expected inflation likely rose by about as much 
as short-run expected inflation did in the 1978-80 period, but the 0.18 co- 
efficient on the unexpected change in expected inflation translates the in- 
crease in expected inflation into an impact on the bond rate that is only 
one-quarter as large as that on the bill rate. The ability of the equation to 
explain three-quarters of  the decline in the bond rate suggests that long- 
run expected inflation has not fallen nearly as much as short-run expected 
inflation, which seems quite plausible in light of  the large outyear struc- 
tural deficits. 
2.5  Summary 
A strong relationship has existed between ex post equity returns and 
business cycle turning points since at least 1926. Somewhere around busi- 
ness cycle peaks-during  the last half-year of  the expansion or the first 
half of  the contraction-investors  sharply reduce their expectations re- 
garding future returns on equities, and the reverse occurs around business 
cycle troughs-during  the last half of recessions and the first 6 months of 
upswings. As a result, stock prices rise near troughs and fall near peaks. 
During the 1953-79 period, ex post equity returns were 32% greater than 
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than the norm in the year surrounding peaks. This cyclical phenomenon 
alone explains over a third of the movement in returns. In the first nine se- 
miannual periods in the 1980s, forecasts of  returns based on the 1953-79 
relationship explain over 70% of the movement in returns, and the cumu- 
lative error of a forecast of the stock market and cumulative dividends is 
less than 1%. Stock market performance so far in the 1980s has not been 
at all unusual. 
In contrast, the level of real interest rates so far in the 1980s differs 
markedly from the prior quarter (nearly half) century. Nominal Treasury 
bill rates moved one-for-one, or slightly less, with changes in expected in- 
flation during the 1951-79 period, resulting in relatively constant real bill 
rates which  averaged 2%. In the  1980s, real rates have averaged over 
5 !h Yo, duplicating the experience of the late 1920s. The source of the pres- 
ent high real rates is unclear, with various authors citing tight money (at 
least until late 1982), increased volatility of  interest rates and monetary 
growth,  easy  fiscal  policy,  business  tax  incentives, and  deregulation, 
among other reasons. More important, on an after-tax basis real rates are 
no higher now than in the 1950s and 1960s. What was unusual were the 
low real after-tax rates in the 1970s. 
My  own research on new issue Treasury coupon rates draws on two 
views of interest rate determination: the expectations theory, whereby ex- 
pected changes in rates can be inferred from forward rates, and structural 
models of  rates in which unexpected changes in rates can be attributed to 
unanticipated changes in expected inflation, economic activity, monetary 
growth, and possibly other factors. The first important result is the con- 
sistency of  the data with the expectations theory. While expected rate 
changes explain little of observed changes in new issue rates, the data are 
consistent with the expectations theory. A second result is a strong positive 
relationship between Treasury rates and economic activity. As operation 
of the economy increases from 70% of capacity to 90%, real Treasury 
rates rise by 2 ‘/z percentage points at the short (1-month) end of the term 
structure to three-quarters of a point at the long (20-year)  end. 
In spite of the “success” of  this research, the difficulties of forecasting 
interest rates should be obvious. Expected changes in rates explain a mi- 
nuscule of 2% of actual changes because surprises are so prevalent. More- 
over, “knowing” inflation, real activity, and money surprises increases the 
ex post explanatory power only to one-third. My sympathy goes to those 
forecasting interest rates for a living. 
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